The press tells a spy story. I read a truce story. My read: the US Department of Commerce’s pause in export control listings behaves like an unwritten term of a truce between the US government (USG) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The USG allows exports of high-end NVIDIA chips to questionable middlemen; PRC allows exports of rare-earth minerals.
The last time the Commerce Department added anyone to the Entity List (its export blacklist) was October 9, 2025. That same day Beijing announced its rare-earth export controls. Three weeks later, Trump and Xi met in Busan and struck the trade truce now in force. In the 400-plus days since, the export blacklist has not grown by one company from any country. This November 9, Commerce extended its truce concession by maintaining the suspension of the rule that would have stretched the blacklist to companies’ subsidiaries. Trump meets Xi again on November 19, in Shenzhen.
The spy story runs through Megaspeed, which was a Singapore buyer of servers built with NVIDIA AI chips, and links all the way back to Alibaba, which is on the Pentagon’s list of Chinese military companies. Alice Huang was Megaspeed’s chief executive and chairperson. The New York Times reports that US officials concluded she was a Chinese intelligence asset. Singapore’s home ministry says she “was not investigated for espionage”; police found too little evidence of the declared offenses, warned her for giving inaccurate information and barred her return. And NVIDIA disclosed the resignation of its founder and CEO on November 12. This isn’t about the spy story; it’s about Megaspeed and Alibaba in the middle of the trade war truce.
Reuters reported in February that after the truce the administration had set aside several planned actions against Chinese tech firms, from a ban on China Telecom’s US operations to curbs on Chinese data-center gear. The New York Times and Axios reported the gap this month. Its shape is what piqued my interest. And Megaspeed, which the Treasury Secretary says four agencies wanted blacklisted, has a secured lender: a unit of Alibaba, which the Times reports is Megaspeed’s “primary client.”
The red bar of truce starts on October 9, 2025, the day Beijing announced its rare-earth controls and three weeks before Busan.
The trade war’s last shots fired before the truce
The Times reported on November 12, citing people familiar with the matter, that Commerce “has essentially halted new technology controls against China, concerned that any measures would upset a fragile truce.” The Federal Register dates it: blacklistings paused from late March to mid-September 2025, while negotiators met in Geneva, London and Stockholm, resumed for two rounds, then stopped. We see one concession in the truce in writing: the White House’s fact sheet lists that a term of the deal was the suspension of the subsidiaries rule. That means that if a blacklisted company has subsidiary companies, then those subsidiaries are not automatically covered by the blacklist. And we know that Alibaba had subsidiaries with involvement in the AI chips trade. The truce’s pause in black listings is not written down anywhere that we could find.
The pause is selective. Fines kept coming at the same pace: ten civil settlements in the four quarters since the listings stopped, and ten in the four quarters before. Staffing doesn’t explain a 400-day zero: apart from special agents, Commerce’s export bureau (BIS) is about the size it was at its last blacklisting. Nor does the Justice Department’s request, reported by the Times and Bloomberg, that Commerce pause its Megaspeed investigation. A pause could explain one stalled investigation, but not a blacklist that does not move.
An Alibaba subsidiary is the secured lender on the hardware in Malaysia
Apex’s balance sheet shows US4.15billion of prepayments and other receivables at March 2025.Megaspeed′s accounts show about US2.89 billion of deposits. Neither names the other party. The collateral secures an advance, but no one has reported on how much yet.
Most of the AI servers the Times traced were bought from Aivres, which is the California arm of China’s Inspur. Apex is a Singapore procurement company whose own accounts name Alibaba Group as its ultimate parent company, and show billions of dollars paid “for [unnamed] services to be performed.”
In June 2024, two months before it began operating and within weeks of the first shipments the Times traced, Megaspeed’s Malaysian subsidiary put up equipment and other assets as collateral for an advance from Apex. The Straits Times reported on November 13 that Malaysian records show the charge still active. I want to know that amount and I can’t find it (yet?).
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who helped negotiate the truce and is a party to this cabinet fight, said on CNBC on November 13 that Treasury, State, Defense and the trade representative “were in favor of putting Megaspeed on the entity list for months.” He also said: “Commerce has the pen.” Defenders of Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told the Times he was doing what the President wanted; Axios reports the President approved action and Lutnick delayed.
Here is where the two halves meet. On my (not a lawyer) reading of the rules, blacklisting Megaspeed would bar American chips and servers from reaching it without a license. But the servers are with its Malaysian subsidiary, and the rule that would automatically extend a blacklisting to subsidiaries was suspended as part of the truce. So a blacklisting with teeth would have to name the Malaysian subsidiary where an Alibaba unit is the secured lender. Beijing’s reaction has been tested at least once. When the Pentagon put Alibaba on its list of Chinese military companies in June, Beijing said Washington had disregarded the leaders’ consensus and restricted dozens of American firms. Alibaba denies military ties and is suing. The truce was extended anyway.
Commerce’s side: it told Reuters in June that it uses the Entity List “on a daily basis,” and told the Times it is still considering new listings and has never directed staff to refrain from targeting any company. Its export chief, Jeffrey Kessler, told a House committee in July that more would come when the administration thinks it appropriate. Commerce can also act by private letter, which is not public.
The companies: NVIDIA said last year that it asked the government whether to cut Megaspeed off and was told no. Megaspeed denies diverting chips and says its offers to cooperate have gone unanswered. Aivres did not respond to the Times in October 2025. We have not seen a public response from Alibaba. Nothing in the filings shows that anyone broke a rule, and no public US blacklisting, charge or penalty names Megaspeed.
These appear to be the legal questions
I’m not a lawyer (but I will be sleeping in a Holiday Inn during my kids’ hockey tournament next weekend). What follows are questions for lawyers:
A Commerce rule that took effect in November 2023 required a license to ship advanced chips to a third country when the exporter knows they are “for an entity that is headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in” a group of countries that includes China. Its example, in full: “a PRC-headquartered cloud or data server provider located in a destination not otherwise excluded.” The rule has since been rewritten for the most powerful AI chips.
NVIDIA’s account is that Megaspeed is “wholly owned and operated by a company based and headquartered outside China, with no China shareholders.” That answers who owns Megaspeed. The rule asks who the chips are for. When an Alibaba unit is the secured lender on equipment, are the servers “for” Alibaba? The owner was checked. Was the secured creditor, by NVIDIA or by the server makers who shipped, Aivres among them? Do they need to be checked?
The Times has described building data centers abroad to serve Chinese clients as legal. It also wrote, in October 2025, that serving customers in China remotely “can be found unlawful if it is done on behalf of a Chinese company.” An Alibaba unit lent money with those servers as collateral, and prepaid for their services. Does that make them Alibaba’s servers in all but name? That is the question the rules appear to ask.
Then there is the clock. An interagency committee decides listings by majority vote. The committee, chaired by Commerce, votes within 30 days after Commerce circulates a proposal, unless every member agrees to wait. The regulation says a decision “shall operate as clearance by all member agencies to publish.” It sets no deadline for Commerce to circulate a proposal or to publish a result. So who can make the pen move?
Does the truce end on January 10, 2027?
Both governments’ suspensions expire on January 10. I don’t know if they’ll extend the truce in the AI trade war, or what happens if they don’t. January 10 is a Sunday. I’ll be in Maryland for a kid’s hockey game.
The whole picture on one page as of Nov 14, 2026: Alibaba’s money, NVIDIA’s hardware, the people, and the listing pause, with each open question tagged to the record that would settle it.
Sources
Government records
Federal Register, October 9, 2025. The last rule adding anyone to the Entity List (FR Doc. 2025-19508). https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2025-19508
Federal Register, November 9, 2026. Extension of the suspension of the affiliates rule to January 10, 2027 (FR Doc. 2026-22793). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/11/09/2026-22793/extension-of-the-suspension-of-expansion-of-end-user-controls-for-affiliates-of-certain-listed
White House fact sheet, November 1, 2025. The terms of the deal with China: the suspension of the affiliates rule, and China’s suspension of the rare-earth controls “that it announced on October 9, 2025.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china/
Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Violations case table, read November 13, 2026. Civil penalties.
https://www.bis.gov
Office of Personnel Management, Federal Workforce Data, Bureau of Industry and Security headcount, to September 2026.
https://data.opm.gov
House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, July 14, 2026. Testimony of Under Secretary Jeffrey Kessler.
Department of Justice press releases and case search, read November 13, 2026. No charge naming Megaspeed or Alice Huang. https://www.justice.gov/news
Federal Register, June 10, 2026. Defense Department designation of Chinese military companies, including Alibaba (FR Doc. 2026-11571). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/10/2026-11571/notice-of-availability-of-designation-of-chinese-military-companies
Federal Register, October 25, 2023. The advanced-computing rule, 88 FR 73458, and the current 15 CFR 744.23 and Supplement No. 5 to Part 744. https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/88-FR-73458
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, November 12, 2026. Statement on its investigations into Alice Huang (Huang Le) and Megaspeed. https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/singapore-investigations-into-alice-huang-huang-le-and-megaspeed-international-pte-ltd/
NVIDIA Form 8-K, filed November 12, 2026 (the board accepted the resignation on November 11). https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001045810
Company filings
Apex Enterprise Solutions (Singapore), financial statements for the year to March 31, 2025, as reproduced in Culper Research, “Nvidia Corp (NASDAQ:NVDA),” May 13, 2026; totals checked against Singapore’s ACRA registry.
Megaspeed International, financial statements for 2024, as reproduced in the same Culper report; totals checked against ACRA.
Speedmatrix Sdn. Bhd., statement of charge dated June 18, 2024, and its 2024 annual report (start of operations), as reproduced in the same Culper report.
Press
Reuters, February 12, 2026, via The Standard. The truce and the shelving of other China tech measures. https://www.thestandard.com.hk/finance/article/324358/US-China-trade-detente-fuels-mothballing-of-key-China-tech-curbs
Reuters, June 16, 2026, via The Standard. The bureau’s reply. https://www.thestandard.com.hk/innovation/article/334863/US-holds-off-blacklisting-Chinas-DeepSeek-more-than-100-firms-deemed-security-risks-sources-say
Axios, November 11, 2026. The listing gap. https://www.axios.com/2026/11/11/bessent-lutnick-megaspeed-nvidia-china-chips
New York Times, October 29, 2026. The reported intelligence conclusion about Alice Huang; Alibaba as Megaspeed’s “primary client.” https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/29/us/politics/nvidia-china-jensen-huang-trump.html
New York Times, November 12, 2026. “Fragile truce”; Commerce’s reply; Lutnick’s defenders. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/12/us/politics/lutnick-nvidia-commerce-china-chips.html
Bloomberg, November 13, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Axios’s report that the President approved action and Lutnick delayed. https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/ai/articles/nvidia-crisis-prompts-scrutiny-lutnick-012320582.html
New York Times, November 9, 2026. The Justice Department’s request to pause; Megaspeed’s current statement; data centers serving Chinese clients described as legal. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/09/business/economy/nvidia-megaspeed-investigation-huang.html
New York Times, October 9, 2025. NVIDIA’s statement on its ownership check; the first shipments and Aivres’s share of those the Times traced, and its non-response; remote service “on behalf of a Chinese company.” https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html
Bloomberg, November 9, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. The pause; NVIDIA on asking the government whether to cut Megaspeed off; Megaspeed’s denial. https://finance.yahoo.com/technology/ai/articles/nvidia-intervened-us-probe-megaspeed-212826572.html
Bloomberg, December 22, 2025. At least US$4.6 billion of imports, from customs data (on the second graphic). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-12-22/nvidia-partner-megaspeed-draws-china-chip-smuggling-concerns-in-us
CNBC, November 13, 2026. Bessent on Squawk Box. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/11/13/us-inflation-outlook-federal-reserve-rate-hike.html
Bloomberg, November 13, 2026, via BNN Bloomberg. “Commerce has the pen.” https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/international/2026/11/13/bessent-blames-lutnicks-us-commerce-department-for-not-restricting-nvidia-chips-to-china/
Straits Times, November 13, 2026, via Asia News Network. The Apex charge, still active in Malaysian records. https://asianews.network/alibaba-megaspeed-financing-link-traced-via-singapore-malaysia-units-amid-nvidia-chip-scrutiny/
Anadolu Agency, June 13, 2026, and Arnold & Porter, July 2026. Beijing’s response to the Alibaba designation. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-opposes-us-move-to-add-alibaba-byd-to-military-linked-list/3966028 and https://arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/advisories/2026/07/china-imposes-export-control-and-government-procurement-restrictions-on-designated-us-companies
Reuters, November 9, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. China extends its own suspensions to January 10, 2027. https://finance.yahoo.com/economy/policy/articles/china-extends-suspension-24-tariff-030006090.html
CNBC, September 25, 2026. The truce extension to January 10, 2027. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/25/trump-xi-summit-takeaways.html




